can be seen above all in their participation in social and political activities, but also in the interest they show towards local politics and in the trust they have in local institutions. This is true for the whole citizenry, but it becomes especially important in the context of multicultural or multiethnic societies, in which several ethnic groups live together. In this case, migrants' political trust, interest, and participation become crucial aspects of their political integration in the receiving society.
In particular, the political involvement of migrants can be considered as a crucial value of multicultural democracies. Every model of democracy places the participation of the members at the center of its reflection. Thus, the traditional republican vision considers political participation as a condition and an element of social life and social cohesion. In the rationalist view of democratic decision-making, participation is considered as a means to surpass the collective action dilemma by creating a source of trust between individual citizens and institutions. Even the most elitist and liberal view of democracy demands a minimum of participation in order to guarantee the legitimacy of political institutions. This legitimacy depends not only on participation, but also on the trust citizens have in institutions. If migrants do not trust political institutions, it is more likely that they will consider political elites and their decisions as less legitimate. They will also consider themselves to a lesser extent as being a part of the local or national political community.
For certain aspects, the importance of political participation for multicultural democracy is underwritten by the concept of political equality. We can speak of multicultural democracy insofar as the different ethnic groups are equal, that is to say, they do not show a significantly lower level of political participation than the autochthonous population. Multicultural democracy can therefore be defined as a form of democracy in which ethnic minorities participate in the democratic process. In doing so, they legitimate the political institutions and give the political elites important information about their own preferences. As a result, we start from the assumption that the more migrants engage in different forms of political participation, but also the more they are interested in local politics, the greater their degree of political integration and the greater the quality of multicultural democracy.
"Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society" as a STREP instrument (Contact No. CIT5-CT-2005-028802) . We thank three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
Spurred by an important article written by Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie (1999) , a network of scholars started to empirically investigate the determinants of the political integration of migrants in several European cities. The goal of this research network is to set up comparable data in different contexts, which are to be analysed following a similar theoretical framework and methodological approach. The central research question is the following: To what extent are immigrants from different ethnic groups politically integrated in the local life of their cities, and what explains the variations in the degree of political integration from one ethnic group to another? To answer this question, national research teams look in particular at the role of three main explanatory factors: (1) the structure of institutional and discursive opportunity structures at the local level; (2) the networks of ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations; and (3) the individual characteristics of migrants.
2 Findings drawn from part of these studies and bearing on the impact of individual-level factors (including organizational membership) were published in a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS) in 2004 (see Jacobs and Tillie 2004) . 3 This article is directly inspired by these works. The aim is to present some of the findings of a population survey conducted in the city of Zurich between December 2006 and January 2007. The data was retrieved as part of an a EU-funded research project. We look at the determinants of the political integration of Italians, Kosovars, and Turks at the local level as a crucial value of multicultural democracy, by focusing on two main dimensions of political integration: political interest and political participation. In particular, we aim to test the argument that membership in voluntary associations produces social capital, which in turn, increases the degree of political integration of migrants into the receiving society (thus contributing to improving the local multicultural democracy). The focus on the local level is also dictated by the large degree of autonomy of local authorities in the formulation, as well as in the implementation of naturalization and integration policies in Switzerland. Thus, the strong decentralization of the political system makes the local level the most appropriate level for studying the political integration of immigrants.
However, in spite of such a relevance, relatively few studies have examined the political integration of immigrants, as well as its conditions at the local level in Switzerland so far (Cattacin and Kaya 2005; Helbling 2008; Wimmer 2004) , and even fewer have focused on their political participation (Eggert and Murigande 2004; Fennema and Tillie 2004; Ireland 1994) .
Explaining the Political Integration of Migrants at the Local Level
The concept of political integration covers a variety of dimensions pertaining to the activities carried by migrants, their attitudes and values, their resources and identities, and so forth. Tillie (2004) , for example, distinguishes at least three dimensions: political trust, adherence to democratic values, and political participation. Other scholars add a fourth dimension: political interest (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004) . Here, we focus on perhaps the two more traditional aspects: political interest and political participation. This includes both attitudinal (interest) and behavioral (participation) aspects of political integration.
We look specifically at the impact of voluntary associations on these two dimensions of the political integration of migrants. More precisely, we look at the organization-integration nexus at the individual level. According to Fennema and Tillie's (1999, 2000) argument, tested in different local contexts in the articles contained in the special issue of JEMS mentioned earlier, the more an immigrant is a member of voluntary associations, the more she or he participates politically. In these authors' perspective, this has something to do with the social capital generated by such an organizational affiliation. Indeed, at the heart of the aforementioned studies of the political integration of migrants in several European cities is the concept of social capital. Ever since the Tocquevillian analyses of American democracy, theorists have pointed to the existence of a relationship between associational life and democracy (Paxton 2002) . Furthermore, starting from the seminal works of Coleman (1988 Coleman ( , 1990 , Bourdieu (1984 Bourdieu ( , 1986 , and more recently Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 2000 , the literature on social capital witnessed an important growth in recent years (see Lin 2001 and Portes 1998 for overviews). The concept of social capital is used in quite different ways by these authors. In particular, we can distinguish between a group-level approach (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 and an individual-level approach (Coleman 1988 (Coleman , 1990 . While the former stresses the collective goods arising from social capital, the latter is more concerned with individual goods (Li et al. 2005) .
Following the perspective that has sprung from the work by Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 2000 and applying it to the study of the political integration of migrants, Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2000) have argued that differences in political participation of ethnic minorities are linked to differences in what they call "civic community". They conceive this "ethnic" social capital of migrants as stemming from participation in ethnic associational life. Drawing from a research tradition that goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville (1990 Tocqueville ( [1835 Tocqueville ( , 1840 ), passes through the work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) , and was more recently revamped by Robert Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 2000 , Jacobs and Tillie maintain that "voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation" (Jacobs and Tillie 2004: 421) . The authors have empirically tested their theoretical argument in a study conducted in the city of Amsterdam. In their study, the degree of ethnic civic community was measured through the density of networks between ethnic organizations (see van Heelsum 2005; Vermeulen 2006 for further analyses following a similar perspective). Such networks are seen as reflecting the amount of social capital at the group level. In this perspective,
[s]ocial capital at the group level is a function of (1) the number of organisations, (2) the variety in the activities of the organisations and (3) the density of the organisational network (Tillie 2004: 531). Clearly, the concept of social capital is ultimately based on a theory of social networks. However, social capital does not only derive from organizational networks as such, but it is translated into individual resources through the involvement in organizations. The number, variety, and density of organizations provide social capital at the group-level, but to explain the political integration of migrants we must take into account their involvement in voluntary associations at the individual level. This is the approach followed in the articles included in the special issue of the JEMS mentioned earlier, and which we adopt in this article as well. 4 However, while organizational membership and the social capital arising from it is the focus of our analysis, one can hardly argue that the political integration of migrants, in both its attitudinal and behavioral aspects, stems only from the social capital generated by their involvement in voluntary associations. Other factors must also be taken into account.
Certainly one needs to consider the social origin of migrants and specific sociodemographic characteristics that may facilitate or impede them from having an interest or participating in politics. This is what is often referred to as the resource model of political participation (Verba et al. 1972) . In this perspective, individual participation is largely determined by resources such as time, money, knowledge, and civic skills, all which are usually the product of an elevated socio-economic status. However, certain more general sociodemographic characteristics, such as age and gender must also be taken into account. Here, we focus on three social aspects of migrants: age, gender, and education. These are all individual traits that were shown in the literature to have a significant impact on political participation in general, and that might affect the political interest and participation of migrants in particular.
Among the resources that can have an effect on the political integration of migrants, language skills are surely an important one. The knowledge of the language spoken in the receiving country arguably plays a crucial role in facilitating political integration . In this regard, one might expect migrants with better language skills (in terms of the language spoken in the receiving society) to be more interested in local political affairs and have a greater participation level in local political activities. We therefore include a variable in our analysis measuring language proficiency.
Finally, we need to take into account the political orientations and attitudes of migrants. Again, a long-standing tradition of thought and research in political participation (in particular, in electoral behavior), starting from Campbell et al.'s (1960) seminal work, has focused on this aspect. The impact of such attitudinal factors as the interest in politics, discussing politics, feeling of political efficacy, satisfaction with politics, and party identification (particularly to explain electoral behavior) have often been examined in the literature, and were found to significantly affect political participation and behavior. More generally, this kind of explanation stresses the importance of motivations and predispositions towards politics. This may also include social and political trust, which can be seen as specific kinds of attitudes favoring political participation. In addition, one may argue that, among the political orientations and attitudes of migrants, certain individual characteristics referring to their individual and collective iden-tity should also be taken into account. Thus, on one hand, the degree of political integration would increase when migrants strongly identify with the receiving country. Indeed, political interest and participation, but also political trust, partly depend on the emotional linkages one is able to build with the place in which she or he lives. On the other hand, one could argue that a strong identification with the homeland would diminish the degree of political integration. However, a strong identification with the country of origin does not necessarily exclude identification with the receiving society. As suggested by Portes et al. (2008) , there is no contradiction between homeland loyalties and activities, and political participation in the receiving country. To get a grip on this aspect, we included in our analyses a variable referring to the identification with the receiving society.
As we have seen earlier, the political integration of migrants in previous studies is measured through various aspects such as political participation, political interest, attachment to democratic values, and political trust. In this article, we focus on political interest and participation. Therefore, since political interest is for us a dependent variable, we obviously do not include it among the explanatory factors. To do so would mean blurring the dependent and the independent variables. Concerning trust, we prefer to consider it as an explanatory variable rather than a dimension of the political integration of migrants. Indeed, trust can be seen as a result of social capital, and thus an intermediate variable between organizational membership and political participation. Social and political trust may strongly affect the political interest and especially the political participation of migrants. This variable has not been considered in the studies included in the special issue of JEMS mentioned earlier. Only Togeby (2004) included it in her analyses, but she found little, if any, effect of this variable. We nevertheless empirically test its effect in our data, focusing on institutional trust. Figure 1 illustrates our explanatory model. We see the political integration of migrants as being influenced by three sets of factors: (1) their associational involvement (here, organizational membership) and the social capital deriving from it; (2) their political attitudes (here, institutional trust, identification with the receiving society, and interest in homeland politics); and (3) their sociodemographic characteristics (here, age, gender, education, language proficiency, duration of residence, and status with regard to naturalization). Associational involvement and sociodemographic characteristics, in turn, are likely to have an impact on political attitudes. In addition to these three sets of factors, we also include in our model two control variables: the interest in homeland politics and the year of arrival in the receiving society. Firstly, interest in homeland politics is included in order to control for a possible "spillover effect" on the interest in the politics of the receiving society. Without doing so, it is difficult to conclude that the latter is a sign of political integration. Secondly, in order for newcomers to become integrated both socially and politically, the duration of residence in the receiving society arguably plays an important role. The longer one has been living in the new country of residence, the more likely she or he is to become integrated. This is all the more important for our analysis, as the three groups studied have arrived at different historical periods.
We should stress that other factors, in addition to those situated at the individual level, are likely to have an impact on political integration. Two important factors in this respect are the structure and density of organizational networks, as well as the political opportunity structure stemming from local integration policies and the prevailing discourse on immigration. The former were stressed in particular by the study discussed earlier Fennema 1999, 2000) and more recently by other scholars as well, both on the North American continent and in Europe (Bloemraad 2006; Pilati 2008; Portes et al. 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemradd 2008; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Vermeulen 2006) . The latter represent a long-standing research tradition in the study of immigration. Characteristics Sociodemographic of immigrants and, more generally, the relationship between the state, citizenship, and immigration (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Freeman 1995; Joopke 1999; Kastoryano 1996; Safran 1997; Soysal 1994; Favell 1998) . However, most of them focused on the national policies, while much less attention was paid on the role of local policies (Garbaye 2005; Helbling 2008; Ireland 1994; Penninx et al. 2004 ). In addition, recent work on the political participation and mobilization of migrants has underlined the role of institutional and discursive opportunities for the political mobilization of migrants (Giugni and Passy 2004, 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005) . However, since these explanatory factors are located at the macro-institutional and meso-organizational level, we do not consider them here, as we focus on the individual level.
Methodological Design of the Survey
We present part of the results of a population survey carried in the city of Zurich between November 2006 and January 2007. The data consists of a random sample of three migrant groups: Italians, Kosovars, and Turks. A control group of Swiss nationals allows us to compare the degree of political interest and participation of migrants with that of the autochthonous population. The data was retrieved as part of the LOCALMULTIDEM project.
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The Zurich sample was generated from the list of addresses provided by the Cantonal Office of Population. Given that this list provides no information about ethnic origin or identification, formal nationalities had to be used as a sampling frame. It is therefore not possible to retrieve immigrants that have been naturalized and hence have Swiss citizenship from this list. We thus define as migrants any people who does not have Swiss citizenship (i.e. foreigners). This is, by the way, the official definition adopted in the Swiss context. This approach contrasts, for example, from the one adopted in previous studies (see in particular the 2004 special issue of the JEMS mentioned earlier), which considers as a migrant any person who is born abroad or who has at least one parent born abroad. However, given the fact that access to citizenship is very limited in Switzerland and there-fore most immigrants are foreigners, our approach allows us to grasp the bulk of migrants living in Zurich.
The interviews were conducted by telephone (CATI) using a standardized, bilingual questionnaire for each migrant group. This was done to minimize potential biases due to different linguistic skills of respondents. Phone numbers were retrieved from the phone book, including the names and addresses of the people in the sample. The average duration of each interview was 35 minutes. In this way, 300 Italians, 302 Kosovars, and 300 Turks were interviewed, in addition to 301 Swiss. In the descriptive analyses below, the latter is considered only as a standard towards which to assess the position of the three groups. Non-response rates are quite similar across the three groups: 57% for Italians, 66% for Kosovars, and 64% for Turks. The three groups of migrants were selected according to their numeric importance in the local context, but also in order to have variation in terms of ethnic and religious background. In the first quarter of 2009, for example, these three groups represented respectively 11.5% (13'637), 8.5% (10'158), and 3.8% (4'475) of the foreign population in the city of Zurich.
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The questionnaire is the outcome of a collective effort made by members of the LOCALMULTIDEM project, which is in turn inspired by a questionnaire previously used in research carried by the "Multicultural Democracy in European Cities" network. It includes among other things, a number of items concerning political integration (including political interest and participation), social and political trust, organizational membership, as well as various sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, and language proficiency. It also includes items which allow for the identification of migrants with the receiving country, as well as the homeland. This is particularly relevant in the Swiss context, as previous studies have shown that in Switzerland the political participation and mobilization of migrants is often oriented towards their homeland rather than towards the receiving society (Giugni and Passy 2004, 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005) . Therefore, all the questions regarding the political interest, participation, and so forth have been asked twice: once with respect to the receiving society and once with respect to the homeland. Here, however, we only consider activities relating to the receiving country.
Descriptive Analysis
In this section, we describe the dependent variable (political integration) and our main independent variable (organizational membership). In contrast to the section below, in which we attempt to explain the political integration of the three migrant groups, here we focus on variations in the degree of political integration and organizational membership across the three groups. We first present the two indicators of political integration, and then the three indicators of organizational membership. For each indicator, we also show the distributions for the control group of Swiss nationals, as a reference point to assess the degree of political integration and organizational membership of the three groups of immigrants.
Political Interest
Political interest is often operationalized through proxies such as talking about politics or other attitudes towards political affairs (Berger et al. 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Jacobs et al. 2004 ). Although we have at our disposal an indicator of talking about politics, we prefer to use a more straightforward measure. Respondents were asked to state on a four-point scale their interest, respectively, in local (city) politics, receiving country (Swiss) politics, and homeland politics.
8 Since our aim is to explain political integration at the local level, here we focus on the interest in local politics.
9 Table 1 shows the degree of political interest of the three groups of migrants studied, as well as the control group of Swiss nationals. The crossgroup differences are statistically significant. However, this is mostly, if not entirely, due to the difference between Swiss and foreign residents. The Swiss are more interested in local politics than any of the three migrant groups, with only 10% of them not at all interested (compared to about one quarter of foreigners). This is in line with the results found in other cities, for example Berger et al. (2004) in Berlin or Jacobs et al. (2004) in Brussels.
10 Thus, on the attitudinal dimension, migrants clearly suffer from a lack of political integration.
The most interesting aspect for us, however, lies in the comparison among the three migrant groups. Here we observe some unexpected patterns. Following a simple and intuitive line of reasoning according to which the older immigration waves should be better integrated into the local social and political life, we would expect Italians on average to be more interested in local politics, as they arrived before both Kosovars and Turks. We would be inclined to think that this holds especially for the group of Kosovars, which is mostly composed of people who migrated to Switzerland recently, often as asylum-seekers, and who should therefore be more alien to Swiss politics. Yet, as we can see from the table, Kosovars display a stronger degree of political interest than both Italians and Turks. A smaller share of this group is not at all interested, while a higher share is very interested in local politics, as compared to the other two groups.
This finding is not easy to interpret without having a closer look at the potential explanatory factors of political interest and, more generally, integration, as we shall see below. At this stage, we can only speculate about possible explanations. One explanation may be found in the migra-10 It should be noted that, while Berger et al. (2004) have compared migrants to Germans in general, Jacobs et al. (2004) have used as a control group a sample of lower-class Belgians. Therefore, our findings are more directly comparable to those obtained in the former study. In addition, our findings are most directly comparable with theirs when they look at national groups (i.e. foreigners) rather than ethnic groups (which include migrants possessing German citizenship). tion process, particularly for Kosovars. Indeed, during the main immigration wave from Kosovo to Switzerland in the 1990s, most immigrants were asylum seekers and many were opponents to the homeland regime. As a result, most of these immigrants were already involved in politics in their country of origin, which could explain their higher political interest.
Political Participation
Contrary to political interest, which refers to attitudes, political participation represents the behavioral dimension of integration. To measure political participation, we use a variable based on a recoding of a list of 13 items each representing a specific political activity. 11 In order to allow for the comparison between migrants (who do not have voting rights, unless they have acquired Swiss citizenship) and Swiss citizens, we did not include forms that are available only to the latter, namely voting and launching or signing popular initiatives, but kept only those activities that are open to everyone. The activities mentioned by the respondents were then added up and the resulting variable recoded in order to form an index of political participation indicating whether respondents have made use of no activity, one activity, two activities, or three or more activities. A similar indicator was used, for example, by Berger et al. (2004) in their Berlin study. Table 2 shows the degree of political participation for each national group, including the Swiss control group. Much like for political interest, cross-group differences in the degree of political participation are statistically significant. However, even more than for the attitudinal dimension of integration, this is because the Swiss are much more active than all three migrant groups. Only about one third of Swiss respondents stated they did not make use of one of the listed activities in the past 12 months, as compared to about 80% of the foreigners. Conversely, while more than 20% of the Swiss have used three or more activities, not even 5% of the foreigners have done so. Thus, the integration differential between migrants and Swiss citizens is especially visible in the behavioral dimension relating to political participation, rather than in the attitudinal dimension concerning political interest. A possible interpretation of this result is that participation poses higher barriers than trust or interest, which requires more resources to overcome. In other words, it is easier for migrants to be interested in the politics of the receiving society than actually participate in political activities.
If we compare the three groups of migrants, no significant differences can be observed. Italians, Kosovars, and Turks display a very similar degree of political participation. This result contrasts with those found in other cities, where cross-group variations were visible (Berger et al. 2004; Tillie 2004; Togeby 2004) . Furthermore, the degree of participation of the three migrant groups in Zurich is substantially lower than that of their homologues in the other cities studied. In Berlin, for example, nearly 20% of Italian respondents (nationals) have used more than three political activities (Berger et al. 2004 ). In Brussels, however, no significant differences were observed between Moroccans and Turks with regard to informal political participation .
12 A possible, although very speculative explanation of such inconsistencies across contexts, may lie in the different status held by these migrant groups in the receiving societies. Italians, in particular, have a particular status. Given their belonging to a EU country, they have voting rights in Berlin, whereas Turks and Morocans in Brussels do not. In Zurich, neither Italians, Kosovars, nor Turks possess such rights. Granting voting rights to immigrants may have a positive effect on their situation, for example by increasing their trust in 12 It should be noted, however, than in the Brussels study the authors have used a different indicator of political participation. the local authorities and therefore favoring their political integration. To our knowledge, no systematic research so far has confirmed the positive impact of voting rights on the political integration of migrants, but one can reasonably expect such a positive effect.
Organizational Membership
The variables measuring organizational participation and membership are operationalized? in a similar way to political participation. Respondents had to mention, from a list of different types of organizations, those of which they were members. The items mentioned were then added up and the resulting scores recoded in order to create a dummy variable. Parties have been excluded from this list in order to avoid concluding quite tautologically that political participation stems from involvement in political organizations. It was also asked whether they participated in activities arranged by those organizations. This aspect is left out from the present analysis in order to focus on membership.
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We distinguish between three types of organizational membership: ethnic, cross-ethnic, and trade-union membership. The distinction between ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations is a very important one with respect to the social capital argument. In Fennema and Tillie's (1999, 2000) perspective, which has spurred subsequent work including ours, cross-groups variations in political participation depend on the degree of "civic community". They conceive this "ethnic" social capital of migrants as stemming from their involvement in ethnic organizations. However, the social capital argument goes beyond such a specific view of the role of organizations and networks, to look at involvement in voluntary associations in general. An important distinction in this regard is that between bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam 2000) . Bonding social capital lies within a specific community, whereas bridging social capital overcomes certain cleavages, in our case the ethnic cleavage. By looking at immigrants' integration, the involvement of immigrants in host society organizations should also be taken into account to test whether ethnic organizational membership and cross-ethnic organizational membership have a different impact on political integration. Indeed, previous work has shown that cross-ethnic organi-zations play an important role and have a distinct impact on the political participation of migrants (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; Tillie 2004; Togeby 2004) .
The criterion to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic organizations is the composition of the membership. Ethnic organizations are those whose membership is more than 50% of foreign background, while crossethnic organizations have less than 50% of their members from migrant origin. Membership in trade unions (less than 50% with an immigrant background) was treated separately in order to be consistent with the studies presented in the 2004 special issue of JEMS, which also distinguish between ethnic, cross-ethnic, and trade-union membership. These studies show that this form of organizational involvement may have a distinct impact on the political integration of immigrants. Table 3 shows the percentages of migrants who are members of ethnic organizations, cross-ethnic organizations and trade unions for each of the three groups, as well as for the control groups of Swiss nationals. Ethnic membership is higher than cross-ethnic membership for all three groups. However, the two types of membership are in general equally distributed in the case of Italians and Kosovars, but not for Turks, whose associational involvement is more ethnic-based. Once again, this finding is in line with the one observed for example in Germany, where involvement in these two types of organizations is also quite balanced, and sometimes ethnic membership is higher than cross-ethnic membership. For example, the Turks in Berlin were found to be more often involved in ethnic organizations than in German ones, while Italians were only slightly more involved in German organizations (Berger et al. 2004) . In Zurich, the associational involvement of migrants is similar to the one in Berlin, although it seems somewhat less segregated than in Germany, perhaps due to the fact that these two countries share a similar model of citizenship (Koopmans et al. 2005) .
In general, Italians are more integrated in organizational networks than the other two groups of migrants. The results of the Berlin study point in the same direction (Berger et al. 2004 ). The difference is particularly important for involvement in cross-ethnic organizations, where the share of Italians who are members of at least one association is significantly higher than among Kosovars and Turks. At the opposite end, Kosovars are less well integrated in organizational networks than Italians and Turks. This is consistent with the expectation that more recent immigrants tend to find it more difficult to get involved in voluntary associations. Nevertheless, all migrant groups are much less integrated than the Swiss nationals in cross-ethnic organizations. Again, this confirms what was found for example in Berlin (Berger et al. 2004) .
Finally, the involvement of migrants in trade unions is higher among Italians than among the other two groups, and even reaches the level of Swiss nationals. While we may think that this is related to the strong unionist tradition in that country or, perhaps more convincingly, to the fact that Italians came mainly as guest workers and therefore more prone to be members of a union in search for social security, the German findings seem to contradict this hypothesis. Italians in Berlin also came as guest workers, but their trade-union membership is lower than that of Turks. Furthermore, Turks also migrated as job seekers, at least in part, although today the main source of Turkish immigration is family reunion.
Explanatory Analysis
We now turn to the assessment of the determinants of the political integration of Italians, Kosovars, and Turks in the city of Zurich. Our main question is: To what extent membership in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations (but also in trade unions) explains the political interest and participation of individual migrants? We do so by means of OLS regressions, following the general model presented earlier (see Figure 1) . Although we focus on the impact of associational involvement (organizational membership), we in- clude in our analyses measures of the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants (age, age squared, gender, education, and language proficiency), and their political attitudes (institutional trust, identification with the receiving society, and interest in homeland politics). We run three separate regressions for each dependent variable (political interest and participation): one for each group (Italians, Kosovars, and Turks). The correlation matrices for the three groups are shown in Appendix A. In addition, we did pairwise group comparisons for each of the two dependent variables (T values) in order to determine whether inter-group differences are statistically significant. The results are shown in Appendix B. Table 4 shows the results of the regressions for political interest, separately for each national group. Contrary to our expectations, associational involvement has only a limited impact on the political interest of migrants, and this impact varies across groups. Specifically, ethnic membership has a significant effect on the political interest of Italians and Kosovars, but not on that of Turks. The inter-group differences are significant between Kosovars, on one hand, and the other two groups, on the other, but not between Italians and Turks (see Appendix B). In addition, the degree of interest in local politics of Italians is also enhanced by their cross-ethnic membership. In this case, the difference is significant only between Italians and Kosovars (see Appendix B). All other indicators of associational involvement are statistically not significant. In particular, trade-union membership has no effect whatsoever. It is not easy to find an explanation for these differences across groups. Concerning the effect of cross-ethnic membership, this may be due to the different positions of the three groups in the receiving society. Italians have a long-standing organizational tradition in Switzerland, and since the first immigration wave, they organized themselves on a national basis. Although in the beginning Italian organizations were mainly oriented towards their homeland, with family reunion migration they started to turn towards integration in the receiving society (Mahnig 2005) . Kosovar and Turkish organizations, in contrast, are mainly oriented towards their country of origin. The important finding for our present purpose, however, is that associational involvement has not a significant effect on political interest across the board, but only a partial one.
Political Interest
Concerning political attitudes, trust in the institutions of the receiving society does not play the same role for all groups in determining the political interest of immigrants. Specifically, the political interest of Italians does not depend on their level of trust in the host country's institutions, while that of Kosovars and Turks is related to their political trust. The inter-group difference between Italians and Turks, however, is not significant (see Appendix B). Therefore, this factor is particularly important for Kosovars. An important wave of immigrants from Kosovo migrated to Switzerland as political refugees during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. These immigrants were very politicized and active. The democratic context they found in Switzerland and the possibility to mobilize and organize, as compared to the situation in their homeland, may explain the high degree of trust in the host country institutions and therefore the positive impact of trust on political interest.
The degree of identification with the receiving society also has a significant effect, but only for Italians and Turks. The difference with Kosovars is significant for both groups (see Appendix B). For these two groups, the more one identifies with the place in which she or he lives, the higher her or his degree of political interest. While this seems quite an obvious result, the lack of effect in the case of Kosovars is puzzling. Unlike Italians and Turks, the latter apparently do not need to identify with the host country to get interested in local politics.
In order to control for the effect of homeland ties, we included a variable measuring the interest in homeland politics. Again, instead of using a proxy for the interest as did Berger et al. (2004) , we use a direct measure of interest in homeland politics in order to keep the same measure of interest in our dependent and independent variables. Our results are similar to those found in Berlin concerning the impact of interest of homeland politics (Berger et al. 2004) . This variable has an important effect for all three groups. Thus, migrants interested in homeland politics tend to also be much more interested in local politics than those who have little or no interest in what happens in their country of origin. Indeed, this interest in homeland politics is the only variable that has a statistically significant effect across all three groups when it comes to explaining the degree of political interest. It is also worth noting that there is a significantly different effect of these variables between Kosovars and Turks (see Appendix B).
Sociodemographic characteristics do not seem to have an important impact on the political interest of migrants, with four exceptions: firstly, Turkish women are less interested in local politics than men; secondly, well educated Turkish immigrants tend to have a higher degree of interest; thirdly, language proficiency strongly increases the degree of political interest of Italians immigrants, but not that of the other two groups; fourthly, naturalized Italians are more interested than those who are not naturalized. These differences across groups, however, are significant only for the last two variables. Specifically, the effects are significantly different between Italians, on one hand, and the other two groups, on the other (see Appendix B). Finally, we should stress in particular the lack of effect of the duration of residence. While one might be inclined to think that the longer one has lived in a place, the more likely she or he is to show a strong interest in the political affairs of that place, here we find that not to be the case.
In sum, the associational involvement of immigrants does not have the expected effect on the attitudinal dimension of political integration, except Notes: * = p ≤ 0.10; ** = p ≤ 0.05; *** = p ≤ 0.01.
for Italians, whose membership in ethnic and cross-ethnic organizations plays a significant role in explaining their political interest in local politics. This is also partly true for Kosovars, whose ethnic membership has an impact as well. Generally speaking, political interest seems to depend more on sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants and on other political attitudes. Thus, the migrants' degree of interest in local politics depends much more on previous attitudes, such as their identification with the receiving society and especially their interest in homeland politics, than on their associational involvement. In addition, we find quite different results across the three groups, which are not always easy to interpret. Do we observe a similar pattern when we look at the behavioral dimension of political integration or do we get different results? Table 5 shows the estimates of the effects of our set of independent variables on the degree of political participation of the three groups of migrants. The results are indeed quite different as compared to political interest, although not completely so. First, associational involvement has a statistically significant effect across all three groups. This holds for both ethnic and cross-ethnic membership. Trade-union membership, however, does not have an impact on the behavioral aspect of political integration, just as it did not have one for its attitudinal side. In spite of the latter result, these findings support the social capital approach, or in any event, show that the involvement of migrants in voluntary associations matters. Net of political attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics, migrants who are members of some kind of organization are more likely to engage in political activities than migrants who are not. Furthermore, we observe a significant effect of both ethnic and cross-ethnic membership. In this sense, our findings support the social capital thesis and show that both bonding (ethnic membership) and bridging (cross-ethnic membership) social capital play an important role in enhancing the political participation of migrants in the receiving society. At the same time, however, ethnic membership has a greater effect than cross-ethnic membership in all three groups, as can be seen in the higher regression coefficients. Concerning inter-group differences, it is worth noting that, just like in the case of political interest, the different effects are significant between Kosovars and Italians and Turks respectively, but not between the two latter groups (see Appendix B).
Political Participation
Political attitudes have very little impact on political participation. Only the interest in homeland politics is statistically significant and solely in the case of Turks. Apart from this, all three indicators have no effect whatsoever. The lack of effect of institutional trust is particularly interesting in this context. Trust is often seen as a vehicle for migrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2000) , but also more generally (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 , to reach a better social and political integration. We have shown earlier that institutional trust has some impact on political interest. Here, we can see that things work differently when we look at political participation. For none of the three groups studied, our measure of trust displays a statistically significant effect. We observe a significant inter-group difference between Italians and Turks, but this is not relevant insofar as the effect of this variable on political participation is not significant for all three groups (see Appendix B).
The fact that trust has an impact on political interest, but not on participation, suggests that it has a positive effect only on the attitudinal dimension of political integration. For migrants to actively take part in the local political life requires more than simply trust in institutions. Does this cast serious doubts on the social capital perspective? At first glance, one would be tempted to answer this question affirmatively, as one of the main arguments of the social capital thesis is that voluntary associations create political trust, which in turn favors participation (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Jacobs and Tillie 2004) . However, social capital could indeed encourage the political participation of immigrants as postulated by this approach, but not through the production of political or institutional trust. Instead, membership in voluntary associations favors participation by providing immigrants with other kinds of resources and skills (Verba et al. 1995) . Similarly, associational involvement produces a more generalized form of social trust, which would then translate into political participation (Togeby 2004; van Londen et al. 2007 ). Thus, our findings question the idea that social capital creates institutional trust, but not necessarily that it favors political participation, although this might occur through other mechanisms.
Similar to the case of political interest, sociodemographic characteristics have little impact on political participation. The single variable that shows a significant effect is education: well-educated migrants are more likely to engage in political activities. This effect, however, is observed only for Kosovars and Italians. Furthermore, the inter-group difference is significant only between Italians and Turks (see Appendix B). All the other sociodemographic characteristics are not statistically significant. It is noteworthy to remark in this regard the absence of an impact of language pro- Notes: * = p ≤ 0.10; ** = p ≤ 0.05; *** = p ≤ 0.01.
ficiency, the duration of residence, and the naturalization status. While one could suspect that migrants possessing good language skills in the place of residence, living there for a long time, and having been naturalized are more inclined to participate politically, these variables play no role in our analysis. The reasons explaining higher levels of political participation are to be searched elsewhere. In sum, more than political interest, the political participation of migrants largely depends on their associational involvement. Specifically, both ethnic and cross-ethnic membership increases the chances that migrants will take part in political activities of their residence country. This impact of organizational membership holds across the three groups studied. These finding is consistent with those observed in similar studies conducted in other European cities, where ethnic and cross-ethnic member-ship generally go a long way in explaining the political participation of migrants (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; Togeby 2004; Tillie 2004) . However, in contrast to these other studies, we find that trade-union membership does not seem to matter. Political attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics have little impact on the political participation of the three migrant groups in Zurich. Finally, we observe less inter-group differences than in the case of political interest, especially when it comes to political attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics.
Conclusion
In this article, we inquired into the determinants of the political integration of migrants at the local level as a crucial value of multicultural democracy. We focused on two dimensions of integration (political interest and political participation), which were also examined in previous work. We addressed the argument that associational involvement spurs political integration. Specifically, we looked at the impact of membership in voluntary associations on the degree of political interest and participation displayed by Italian, Kosovar, and Turkish migrants in the city of Zurich. In line with recent work in the field, we distinguished between three types of organizational membership: ethnic, cross-ethnic, and trade-union membership. These types of organizational membership would lead to different forms of social capital. In particular, while membership in ethnic organizations would yield bonding social capital (within groups), membership in crossethnic membership would produce bridging social capital (across groups).
The results of our analysis show that the attitudinal dimension of political integration depends less on membership in organizations than expected. Indeed, except for Italians, for whom both ethnic and cross-ethnic membership have a positive effect on interest in local politics, and partly for Kosovars, whose ethnic membership favorably impinge upon this aspects of political integration, the most important determinants of political interest are previous attitudes such as institutional trust, identification with the receiving society, and interest in homeland politics. For all three groups, the latter variable has the greatest impact on their interest in local politics. In addition, while associational involvement has only little effect on the attitudinal dimension of political integration of immigrants, the results confirm the social capital hypothesis for the behavioral dimension of integration. For all three ethnic groups, organizational membership has a positive effect on the degree of political participation. This holds for both ethnic and cross-ethnic membership, although the former has a greater effect. Trade-union membership, in contrast, does not seem to increase political participation.
The results of our analysis, of course, cannot be generalized easily. We have focused on a specific local context and three ethnic groups. However, our findings can be compared, although not directly, with previous studies presented in the 2004 special issue of the JEMS. The results of the surveys conducted in the four countries studied in the articles included in that special issue (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands) have stressed in particular the impact of language proficiency and ethnic membership, but also that of cross-ethnic membership and trade-union membership (Jacobs and Tillie 2004: Table 2 ). We could not confirm the effect of language proficiency, except in the case of the political interest by Italian immigrants. However, our study has confirmed the important role played by migrants' involvement in organizational networks and the social capital arising from it. Membership in voluntary associations seems to be an important vector of social capital, and therefore to contribute to enhance multicultural democracy. Furthermore, we found evidence that both bonding and bridging social capital play an important role in this process.
Thus, we can say that associational involvement to an important extent spurs political integration, although the mechanisms through which this occurs still need to be clarified. Our findings suggest that social capital does not so much favor political participation through the creation of institutional trust, but perhaps through other resources and skills, including a more generalized social trust, which can be put at work in political activities. At the same time, the political integration of immigrants in Zurich depends on different factors according to the ethnic groups. What these results suggest is the need to take into consideration in a more systematic way the institutional and the discursive opportunity structures in determining political integration, not only for cross-country comparison but also in comparing groups in the same context. Indeed, if results differ between ethnic groups within the same contexts, but also between the same ethnic groups in different contexts, they suggest that the institutional and discursive contexts towards immigrants play a role in determining their political integration.
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